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12 Freedom and rights 
Richard Dagger 
'[T]hat ill deserves the Name of confinement that hedges us in only 
from Bogs and Precipices.' These words, from §57 of John Locke's 
Second Treatise of Government, have long posed a challenge to those who 
hold that a firm commitment to negative liberty - that is, to liberty 
understood as the absence of interference, impediment or restraint - is 
one of the defining features of liberalism. To be sure, Locke goes on 
to acknowledge that 'Liberty is to be free from restraint and violence 
from others'; but this liberty, he insists, 'cannot be, where there is no 
law' (Locke 1965 [1689-90]: 348). The challenge, then, is to show either 
that Locke is wrong, because the laws and hedges that keep us from 
falling into bogs or over precipices really do deprive us of liberty, or that 
he is not the arch-liberal he is so often taken to be. 
Locke's words also pose a second challenge, however, one which is 
more pertinent to the concerns of the present volume. To put it simply, 
does Locke gives bogs and precipices their due? Is it not possible that 
bogs and precipices, as parts of nature, have interests and perhaps even 
rights of their own - rights that require the hedging in or confining of 
human beings, not so that we may live freely, but so that bogs and 
precipices may? Or might it not be possible that we diminish our own 
freedom or violate somebody's rights when we drain a bog or turn a 
precipice into a gentle slope? Questions of this sort could hardly have 
occurred to Locke and his contemporaries, but they are inescapable in 
our time of ecological challenge. 
What follows, then, is an attempt to rethink freedom and rights in the 
light of this ecological challenge. This attempt, I should note, will 
proceed largely within the liberal tradition, at least if liberalism is 
understood as a theory that has much in common with civic repub-
licanism (see Dobson's chapter in this book). I proceed in this way for 
two reasons. First, liberalism in one form or another now seems to be 
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the dominant position among political theorists, and a book of this sort 
will have to speak to liberal concerns if it is to have any practical effect. 
Within political theory, moreover, the most influential analyses of the 
concepts of freedom and rights have been the work of liberal philoso-
phers. If we are to consider how political theorists should conceive of 
rights and freedom in the light of the ecological challenge, we shall have 
to attend to these analyses. 
Liberalism, of course, is quite a capacious theory, with room for lib-
erals to debate quite vigorously among themselves, as well as with others, 
the meaning and significance of freedom, rights and other concepts. It is 
also capacious enough to allow for a rethinking of these concepts at a 
time of pressing environmental problems. Such a rethmking, I shall 
argue, should lead us to conceive of freedom and rights less as barriers or 
shields that protect individuals against interference - as forms of inde-
pendence - and more as matters of organic growth and connection, or 
interdependence. Indeed, we must conceive of freedom and rights in this 
organic, interdependent way if we are to respond adequately to the 
ecological challenge. If Garrett Hardin is right, we shall have to rely upon 
'mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon' if we are to avoid environ-
mental tragedy (Hardin I 968). But it will be easier to agree to this mutual 
coercion if we see our rights not as inviolable barriers agamst others but 
as forms of relations that entail responsibilities to others. I shall argue, 
therefore, for a move away from the negative conceptions of rights and 
freedom and toward an understanding that relates both concepts to 
autonomy. If this seems to be a self-defeating leap from one negative, 
atomistic way of thinking to another, I can only ask the reader to bear 
with me until I explain what I mean by 'autonomy'. 
The nature of freedom and rights 
Philosophers frequently frame their discussions of rights and freedom in 
terms of the negative/positive distinction. In the case of liberty, Thomas 
Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham are two of the most influential to conceive 
of it negatively - that is, as the absence of impediment or restraint. 
T. H. Green later argued that freedom, 'rightly understood', 1s 'a positive 
power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or 
enjoying ... in common with others' (Green 1991 [1880]: 21). But 
Green's notion of positive liberty includes an evaluative element that 
strikes many scholars as misplaced. Can't we be JUSt as free, they ask, 
when we do or enjoy something that is not especially worthwhile as when 
we do or enjoy something that is? For that matter, can't we freely 
do something reprehensible or vicious? These obJecuons may not be 
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altogether fair to Green, whose concern was not so much with whether 
individuals act freely when they do this or that as with 'the ideal of true 
freedom', understood as 'the maximum of power for all members of 
human society to make the best of themselves' (Green 1991 [1880]: 23). 
But this emphasis on 'true freedom' as making the best of oneself only 
heightens the problems of positive liberty, according to a line of argu-
ment made famous by Isaiah Berlin's 'Two Concepts of Liberty'. 
Positive freedom is a worrisome notion, Berlin charges, partly because 
it confuses freedom with ability - '[m]ere incapacity to attain a goal is 
not lack of political freedom' (Berlin 1969: 122) - but even more 
because of its implicit reliance on a distinction between two selves: the 
lower or empirical self and the true, real or higher self with which it is 
often at odds. Once we draw this distinction, Berlin says, we are 
in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, 
torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their 'real' selves, in the secure 
knowledge that whatever 1s the true goal of man (happiness, performance of duty, 
wisdom, a just society, self-fulfilment) must be identical with his freedom -the free 
choice ofhis 'true', albeit often submerged and inarticulate, self. (Berlin 1969: 133) 
Thus does positive liberty open the door to tyranny. Better, then, to 
cleave to the negative conception of liberty as, in Berlin's terms, the 
absence of interference. 
Reinforcing this view is the tendency to draw a distinction between 
negative and positive rights. In this case the distinction rests on the 
understanding of rights as valid claims that impose correlative duties or 
responsibilities on the part of others. There is some controversy on this 
point, but there is also general agreement that the kind of right with 
which we are most often concerned in moral, political and legal philo-
sophy is the claim-right, and claim-rights - for example, the rights you 
acquire when I sign a contract to work for you - entail correlative duties. 
A negative right thus is one that imposes only a duty of non-interference 
on others, such as the right to speak freely, whereas a positive right 
requires someone's active assistance or compliance, as in the putative 
right to medical care. As 'putative' here suggests, scholars and jurists 
often assume that negative rights are the principal or primary form of 
rights - the real rights, as it were - because they protect the individual 
from interference and thereby preserve his or her liberty. Negative rights 
are thus conceptual kin to negative liberty. 
In neither case, however, is the negative view of rights or liberty en-
tirely persuasive. With regard to rights, the distinction between negative 
and positive proves to be difficult, at best, to sustain (Shue 1980: 35-64). 
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Negative rights supposedly require only forbearance on the part of those 
who may be tempted to interfere with us, as in the case of the person 
who has no duty to hear me out but does have a duty not to shut me 
up when I exercise my right to free speech. Yet many supposedly neg-
ative rights make no sense unless there is a system of social co-operation 
and supporting institutions that demand more than merely leaving one 
another alone. Your right to vote, for example, imposes a duty of non-
interference on others, but it also requires them to support the registrar's 
office, the board of election commissioners, and other institutions that 
make voting possible (Waldron 1993: 580). If we are to be reasonably 
secure in the enjoyment of our supposedly negative rights, moreover, we 
must be able to rely on the police, the courts, the county recorder's 
office and other instruments of the legal system, all of which impose 
more costs on others than the cost of mere forbearance (Holmes and 
Sunstein 1999). 
The difficulty here is especially evident if we consider rights that are 
linked to the physical environment. At first glance, someone who claims 
a right to experience wilderness or to enjoy a healthy environment is 
claiming a negative right. That is, she is telling us not that we should 
provide her with an all-expense-paid trip to the nearest wilderness or 
healthy environment, but that we should not interfere with her experi-
ence or enjoyment of them. The problem, however, is that one cannot 
experience wilderness or enjoy a healthy environment when these things 
are not available, and their continued existence, or restoration, requires 
more than non-interference on the part of others; it requires at least that 
we impose rules that restrict access and use lest there be no wilderness 
left to experience. If we want to make a case for environmental rights of 
this sort, then we are necessarily making a case for the active assistance 
and compliance, as well as forbearance, of other persons. 
A similar problem arises with regard to negative liberty. There is little 
dispute that freedom is in part a matter of being free from impediment 
or restraint, but Locke and others have supplied ample reason to think 
that there is more to freedom than that. According to one well-known 
analysis, freedom is always a matter of some agent's being free from 
some obstacle m order to be free to do something (MacCallum 1967), 
and Charles Taylor and others have gone on to argue that what one is 
free to do is at least as important as what one is free from. Taylor's 
striking contrast between London and Tirana, the capital of communist 
Albania in the 1970s, illustrates the difference between freedom as 
an opportunity-concept and an exercise-concept. Religion had been 
abolished m Albania, Taylor observes, but 'there are probably far fewer 
traffic lights per head in Tirana than in London', where people are free 
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to worship in public places even if only a minority do so. As the 'number 
of acts restricted by traffic lights must be greater than that restricted 
by a ban on public religious practice', it follows that the residents of 
Tirana are less restricted, and have more opportunities to move through 
town, than Londoners (Taylor 1979: 183). Yet few people would con-
clude that Tirana's residents are therefore freer than Londoners. 
All opportunities are not equal. Once this is admitted, however, 1t 
becomes necessary to find some way of discriminating between impor-
tant and insignificant opportunities, which is to say that evaluative 
judgements about what is worth doing or enjoying cannot be divorced 
from assessments of freedom in the way that advocates of negative 
liberty have claimed. On Taylor's account, these judgements implicitly 
appeal to the positive conception of freedom as 'the exercising of control 
over one's life' - hence, freedom as an exercise-concept (Taylor 
1979: 177). 
Philip Pettit has recently employed a related distinction between 
option-freedom and agency-freedom as part of his argument for the 
'republican' conception of freedom as non-domination. When we speak 
of freedom, he says, we sometimes have in mind how plentiful or scarce 
someone's options are; the more choices available to someone, the freer 
she is. In other cases, though, we have the person's status as a 'free 
agent' in mind - as someone who does not have 'to depend on the grace 
or mercy of others, being able to do one's own thing without asking their 
leave or permission' (Pettit 2003: 394). That is why we regard a non-
arbitrary law that deprives us of some options as something very dif-
ferent from criminal interference that has the same effect. Pettit does not 
refer to §57 of Locke's Second Treatise in this context, but he could well 
have done so when he explains how a law may at the same time be 
'inimical to one variety of freedom while being friendly to the other' 
(Pettit 2003: 398). Other things being equal, of course, we will want to 
have as much option-freedom as possible while maintaining our agency-
freedom. What we should not want, according to Pettit, is to extend our 
option-freedom if it means sacrificing our status as free agents. We 
should also be wary, to give a green cast to Pettit's argument, of 
extending the option-freedom of people today in ways that threaten the 
sustainability of the environment and reduce the options - and perhaps 
even the agency - of future generations (Holland 1999; Norton 1999). 
To be a free agent, for Pettit, is to be free from domination. That is 
why he regards republican freedom as a form of negative liberty - as the 
absence of domination. Like Taylor, however, he clearly believes that 
freedom 1s more than the absence of interference, impediment or 
restraint. To hold the status of free agent is to be recognised as someone 
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who is capable of acting and of taking responsibility for those actions. 1 
But as 'status' and 'recognised' imply, one cannot be a free agent 
entirely on one's own. Others must see and treat me as a free agent, and 
laws, police and courts are necessary to protect me against those who 
would not. Nor do my options always increase when others simply leave 
me alone, for their indifference or distance will deprive me of the 
opportunity to do all of those things, such as the tango, that reqmre two 
or more people. As with negative rights, m sum, so with negative liberty: 
attempts to protect our independence agamst mterference founder on 
our inescapable interdependence. 
The freedom and rights of nature 
But what has this to do with bogs and precipices? Do they, or other parts 
of nature, or nature as a whole, have rights -- negative, positive or 
otherwise - that impose duties on human beings? Should they be free 
from our interference, or liberated from our domination, to go their own 
way? Or does it make no sense to speak of bogs, prec1p1ces and other 
parts of non-human nature as free agents with nghts agamst us? These 
are much-discussed questions, and I cannot hope to rehearse the 
debates adequately here, much less resolve them. Nevertheless, I shall 
state my position - one that is nearer to social than to deep ecology - and 
sketch my reasons for taking it. 
With regard to the possible freedom of nature or Its elements, there 
are two reasons for resisting this way of thinking that seem to me 
decisive. The first has to do with agency and the second with what 
Christopher Stone has called the 'ontological problem' (Stone 1974: 34 
and passim). Agency is an important cons1derat10n because, following 
Pettit and Taylor, there is more to freedom than having options or being 
free from impediments. If we ask whether nature is capable of freedom, 
the answer should begin by noting not only that 'nature' is notonously 
difficult to define, but that it seems to fall mto three broad categories. At 
one extreme are those natural objects and ammals to which we cannot 
reasonably attribute free action; at the other are human bemgs, who 
typically have the potential for agency. In the middle category are those 
animals that give enough evidence of preferrmg and choosmg to warrant 
the belief that they act freely, in Pettn's sense of option-freedom, but 
not that they are agents. Thus we speak of hons bemg 'born free' or of 
deer 'ranging freely', even though neither lions nor deer are agents 
' On agency, see Pettit 2001, esp. ch. 1. For a less stringent conception of agency that 
allows for 'agency in nature', sec Dryzek 2000: 148--52, but cf Dobson 1996. 142-44, 
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responsible for their deeds. Bogs, precipices, trees, rocks and other 
natural objects do not exercise option-freedom, however, nor is it any-
thing more than metaphor to write, as Dave Foreman does, of 'freeing 
shackled rivers' from the dams that confine them (Foreman 1991: 407). 
We do occasionally personify rivers and other forces of nature, as when 
we call the Mississippi 'Old Man River', and we may even talk of tearing 
down a dam so that a river may be 'free to follow its course'. But this 
is on a par with saying that untying a ribbon or pulling out some pins 
'freed' someone's hair. We know that the river will flow once the dam is 
out of the way because it cannot choose to remain cooped up in a lake or 
reservoir. In Pettit's terms, it has neither agency-freedom nor option-
freedom. There may be good reasons to tear down dams that block 
rivers, to be sure, or to leave bogs, precipices and other natural 'objects' 
as they are, but promoting or respecting their freedom is not one of them. 
The example of the river also illustrates the ontological problem that 
Christopher Stone struggles to overcome in his brief for the legal 
standing of nature and natural objects. The problem is that there is no 
obvious or certain way of identifying just what it is that should be freed 
when someone sets out to free the natural. Is it the river, or the molecules 
of water that compose it, or the atoms that compose them? Or is it the 
river valley, or the hydrologic cycle? Or the bioregion, or the whole of 
nature? Stone's answer is to say, first, that it depends on what one is 
concerned with: 'from time to time one will wish to speak of that portion 
of a river that runs through a recognized jurisdiction; at other times, one 
may be concerned with the entire river, or the hydrologic cycle - or the 
whole of nature' (Stone 1974: 9, n. 26). The 'one' who wishes to speak, 
however, and the 'one' who has the concern is not a river or valley or 
cycle but a person - an agent that is capable of giving voice to his or her 
concerns. This leaves us with Stone's second answer, which is to say that 
this ontological problem applies to persons as much as to natural forces 
and objects. And it is true that we talk not only of a person's being free 
but also, at times, of a people's or a country's freedom. In the latter case, 
though, we know that the elements that compose the people or country 
differ from the elements that compose the river by being themselves, at 
least potentially, free agents. We know this, in particular, because 
individual persons sometimes make it clear that those who claim to 
speak for their country do not speak for them - something that we can 
hardly expect of a tree in the forest or a drop of water in the pond. 
Stone's second response to the ontological problem is thus no more 
successful than his first. 
To be fair, Stone's concern is to make a case for the legal rights of 
nature, not for its freedom. But his arguments fare no better when 
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applied to rights. Indeed, the ontological problem is perhaps even more 
vexing in the case of rights than in that of freedom. Is it the tree that has 
rights or the forest? Does the tree have rights or the river that is 
uprooting it, or - to bring animal nature into the discussion - the bark 
beetle that is killing it? Or do all of these entities have rights that, like the 
rights of persons, sometimes come into conflict with one another? And if 
they do, how are these conflicts to be adjudicated? 
These and similar questions have prompted Roderick Nash to observe 
that the 'use of "rights" in this connection has created considerable 
confusion. Suffice it to say ... that while some use the term in a tech-
nical philosophical or legal sense, others take it to mean that nature, or 
parts of it, has intrinsic worth which humans ought to respect' (Nash 
1989: 4). I am less willing than Nash to excuse the confusion, and not 
only because of a professional interest in being as clear as possible in the 
use of important concepts. Another concern is the risk of an 'escalation 
of rights rhetoric' that threatens either to overwhelm other concepts and 
considerations or, by a process of conceptual inflation, to rob the appeal 
to rights of much of its power. 2 If we can make a case for the worth of 
nature without appealing to the rights of nature, then we should do so. 3 
To say that, however, is to assume that we cannot make, in Nash's 
words, 'technical philosophical or legal sense' of the rights of nature, 
and I should explain why I think that assumption is warranted. In my 
view, the only entities that have rights are those that are able to respect 
the rights of others. Arsonists have rights, for example, but bolts of 
lightning do not. Both may destroy my house, but only the arsonist 
violates my rights in doing so, and only the arsonist, not the lightning 
bolt or the forest fire, can enjoy various legal rights when brought to 
justice - including, on some views, a right to be punished. In other 
words, rights presuppose agency. 
This is not, I should note, a view universally accepted among those 
who analyse rights in the 'technical philosophical or legal sense'. In Joel 
Feinberg's oft-cited analysis, it is not agency but interests that make 
something a bearer of rights (Feinberg 1980). On the agency account, 
after all, we should refuse to attribute rights not only to rocks, plants and 
non-human animals, but also to babies and other human beings - vic-
tims of stroke, for example, or various forms of dementia - who plainly 
lack agency. Yet we commonly hold that these people have rights, so it 
must be that their rights follow from their interests, such as their interest 
2 The quoted phrase is from Sumner 1987: l See also Golding 1990: 60-4, and \Vellman 
1999: ch. 5. 
3 Goodin 1992 is exemplary in this regard, but I do not endorse his consequentialism. 
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in life, nutrition and escaping cruelty. And if we recognise these rights in 
humans incapable of agency, then we must also recognise them in other 
beings that have these interests - not in plants, bogs or precipices, 
according to Feinberg, but at least in the higher animals. If one protests 
that rights are claims, and we ought not to predicate rights of something 
or someone that cannot press a claim, Feinberg's response is to agree 
with the first assertion but not the second. Rights are indeed claims, in 
his view, but all that is necessary is that someone be able to press the 
claim in behalf of the rights-bearer, not that this someone be the rights-
bearer him-, her- or itself. 
Given Feinberg's analysis, why cling to the view that rights pre-
suppose agency? The answer is that Feinberg fails to take account of the 
two senses in which someone or something has an interest. Here I follow 
S. I. Benn, who pointed out a telling difference between what one is 
interested in and what is in one's interests (Benn 1977= 405-n). Babies and 
non-human animals surely have an interest in food, shelter and whatever 
is conducive to their wellbeing. But that requires no activity on their 
part, no sense of giving a direction to one's life that happens when one 
takes an interest in something. Rights are important here as claims 
because they are 
normative resources that enable [a person], by controlling the actions of others, 
to manipulate his social environment for his own ends - whatever those ends 
may be. Having rights enables him to pursue what he zs interested zn; and this may 
be very different from what is in his interests. (Benn 1977: 407; emphasis in 
original) 
Following Benn rather than Feinberg, however, still leaves us with 
the problem of babies and the demented. Don't they have rights despite 
their lack of agency? They do, in my judgement, by virtue of their 
potential in the one case and their past in the other. In the normal 
course of affairs, a human infant will gradually take an interest in giving 
a shape to his or her life and become someone capable of respecting 
the rights of others; and it is our recognition of this potential that 
warrants our attributing rights to infants. In the case of the irretrievably 
demented, we are justified in according them rights in recognition 
of what they would have done or would do were they still agents. And 
what of those unfortunate infants who apparently Jack the potential 
ever to become agents? These children have no rights, in my view, but 
that is not to say that they may be disposed of or treated however we sec 
fit. Some things are wrong even when done to entities that have no 
rights. 
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IfI am correct, then, about rights presupposing agency, it follows that 
bogs, precipices and non-human nature have no rights. If I am wrong 
and Feinberg is correct, all that follows is that the category of rights-
bearer extends to many, but not all, non-human animals. Bogs and 
precipices are still excluded. But that is most emphatically not to say 
that they are of no account or no worth. It is to say, instead, that we 
must look for other ways to make the case for the value of nature. We 
must also look for ways to rethink our rights and freedom, as persons, in 
light of the ecological challenge. 
Ecology and autonomy 
As Nash observes in The Rzghts of Nature (Nash 1989), Stone and 
Foreman and others who want to accord nghts to nature or to liberate it 
from human domination typically take Aldo Leopold's 'land ethic' as 
their point of departure. They do so wnh good reason, for Leopold's 
account of the evolution of ethics offers some hope to those who want to 
bring about a shift in consciousness. There was a time, Leopold remarks, 
when many people were regarded simply as property and not, therefore, 
as worthy of ethical considerat10n; hence Odysseus' hanging twelve 
slave girls all on one rope was a matter of expedience rather than ethics. 
We would condemn such an action now, and properly so, but that is 
because our sense of who counts has expanded to embrace more and 
more people as full members of the ethJCal community. In light of our 
increasing understanding of our interdependence with the natural world, 
moreover, we now have good reason to expand the ethical community 
even more dramatically by adopting a land ethic that 'enlarges the 
boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and ani-
mals, or collectively, the land' (Leopold 2004 [1949]: 417). 
Like Stone, Foreman and many others, I find this a powerful argu-
ment. Its power, however, does not reside m appeals to the rights of 
nature or pleas for its freedom, for Leopold does not press his case m 
those terms. Instead, its power lies m leadmg people to see themselves as 
parts of nature who both depend on it and have a special responsibility 
for its care. The land ethic is not addressed to the land, or even to the 
higher animals, but to persons, the only bemgs capable of reading and 
acting on Leopold's words:+ I take 1t, then, that it is our freedom and 
nghts as persons that must be reconsidered if we are to adopt a land 
ethic that will enable us to address the ecological challenge brought on 
4 Gerald Gaus (1998: 252-3) reaches a s1m1lar conclusion by a \'cry different route, 
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by people who have been acting freely and, for the most part, within 
their rights as ordinarily understood. 
This reconsideration must begin, as Leopold insisted, with an 
appreciation of the extent to which we are bound up with nature - or, 
properly speaking, with the rest of nature. Ecology, the science of 
the interrelationship of organisms and their environment, teaches this 
lesson, and part of the ecological challenge consists in helping people to 
see, as a familiar distinction puts it, that they are not apart from nature so 
much as a part of it. Freedom is not something to be wrested from 
nature, on this view, nor rights simply a way of dividing nature into what 
is properly mine and thine. They are, instead, to be exercised and 
enjoyed within the bounds of nature. What an ecological or land ethic 
does, in other words, is to encourage us to think of our relationship to 
nature as a matter of autonomy. 
This statement is likely to strike many readers as implausible, as I 
noted earlier, and perhaps altogether wrongheaded. That is because 
autonomy is often understood as a kind of global or summary condition 
attributed to those who enjoy extensive negative freedom, as in the 
'personal autonomy' of the individual who is generally free from inter-
ference to do and say as he wishes whenever and wherever he wishes to 
do or say it. Or it might refer to the condition of one who is not only free 
from interference by other people, but free also in the sense of having 
considerable power over nature - free to cross rivers on bridges, to water 
her lawn when she pleases, to fly across oceans and continents on 
aeroplanes, and so on. Such a person is autonomous, self-governing, in 
large part because of her ability, in co-operation with others, to govern 
nature. So understood, autonomy is an attractive ideal to many people. 
Yet it is difficult to see how it comports with a land or ecological ethic. 
The difficulty will not seem so great, however, once we notice that 
autonomous people may also govern themselves with an eye to the 
effects of their actions on the physical environment. Autonomy is self-
government, not licence, and it is a condition that we can properly 
attribute only to those who have a sufficient degree of self-awareness to 
be capable of governing themselves. 5 Nor is there any reason to think 
that such people cannot also see themselves as being interdependent 
both with other people and with nature as such. The question, then, is 
not whether autonomy is compatible with the land ethic, but whether 
5 Cf. Eckersley (1996: 223) for a 'more inclusive notion of autonomy' as 'the freedom of 
human and non-human beings to unfold in their own ways and live according to their 
"species life".' But this seems to conflate autonomy with flounshmg. 
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the pursuit of autonomy, properly understood, leads to an endorsement 
of the land ethic. 
Pettit's distinction between option-freedom and agency-freedom 
provides a helpful way to begin to answer this question. As Pettit says, 
the more options we have, the freer we are; but 'number alone may not 
be that important' (Pettit 2003: 392). Havmg a choice among '20 barely 
discernible beers', to borrow his example, will mean little to the wine-
fancier and the teetotaller, who would no doubt think themselves freer if 
there were something besides beer on offer. Even the beer drinker is 
likely to think that a choice of twenty beers does not make her twice as 
free as a choice of ten would do - especially if her favourite is among the 
ten. And the recovering alcoholic who has only one beer set before him 
may think that one is enough to challenge his agency-freedom, as turning 
down twenty varieties would not show him to be more of a free agent -
more autonomous, more self-governmg - than turnmg down any one of 
them. What counts is the value of the options, not merely the number. 
How, then, should we evaluate our options? One way is to ask what 
taking this option may mean for other options we may want to pursue, 
or leave open for others, at some time. To take an option is to act, and 
actions have consequences, one of which quite often is the foreclosing of 
other options. Having the option to dnve one's motorcycle without 
wearing a helmet is only one of the most familiar of many such exam-
ples. Other examples speak more directly to civic and environmental 
concerns. Wal-Mart and other 'big-box' stores offer a vast array of 
consumer goods that promise option after option. \'Vhen these stores 
move into town, however, they reduce the options of those who might 
want to be a main-street merchant. Such stores also contribute to 
metropolitan sprawl, the urban heat-Island effect, and other environ-
mental problems as they convert farm land and open country mto acres 
of car parks - lots that themselves grow larger to accommodate the 
gasoline-guzzling 'Sport Utility Vehicles' that Americans, at least, seem 
to need to haul away the big-screen telev1s1ons and other goods they buy 
at these stores. 6 For all its celebration of choice, the consumer culture 
manifest in these stores makes some options much more available than 
others. 
From the ecological standpomt, furthermore, the options that con-
sumer culture makes most readily available are those that offer short-
term benefits to ind1v1duals at the cost of long-term damage to the 
environment. In the Umted States, for mstance, time spent m traffic 
continues to mcrease along with car ownership and the distance people 
6 For further remarks nn (sub )urban sprawl, see Dagger 2003 
212 Richard Dagger 
live from their workplaces. Frustration with traffic congestion has led to 
increased funding for mass transit, but it has also produced two less 
wholesome results: the addition of many miles of roads and highways, 
with the resulting urban sprawl, and increasingly comfortable cars. 
Rather than give up their cars, in other words, people want new and 
improved roads, which seem to fill up and become congested almost as 
soon as they are opened; and so as long as they are going to be stuck in 
traffic, people want cars with air conditioning, entertainment systems 
and plenty of head, leg and hip room. Meanwhile, as they wait com-
fortably if not contentedly in traffic, their cars continue to burn petro-
leum, spew carbon dioxide-laden fumes into the air, and drip pollutants 
on to the ground (Kay 1997). 
When evaluating our options, then, we should do what we can to take 
those that truly preserve or extend our freedom rather than those that 
sooner or later will deprive us of it. We should also evaluate these 
options with an eye to their implications for autonomy. As the examples 
of Taylor's Tirana and the recovering alcoholic demonstrate, multi-
plying options does not always enhance autonomy, understood as the 
ability to lead a self-governed life: someone who is able to turn down 
twenty kinds of beer is not twenty times as self-governing as someone 
who has only one to refuse. What matters is that we have options that 
promote the ability to be self-governing. This means that we must be 
able to enjoy a reasonably secure sense of the self as something that is 
not simply the plaything of external forces or the creature of ungo-
vernable impulses. Autonomy in this sense is sometimes taken to be a 
kind of self-creation, as if the self were capable of sitting in judgement on 
all of one's traits and desires, rejecting those that do not conform to 
one's self-conception and forging a unit out of those that do. There is 
some truth to this conception of autonomy, I think, as anyone who 
appreciates the distinction between first- and second-order desires - that 
is, the second-order desire not to have the first-order desire for, say, 
alcohol or sweets - will recognise. But that is not to say autonomy is the 
ability to create oneself entirely as one sees fit, from the ground up. On 
the contrary, self-discovery is at least as important to autonomy as self-
creatzon. We must know our aptitudes and inclinations, our motives and 
limitations, in order to have the self-awareness that makes autonomy 
possible. This, apparently, is the kind of knowledge that the alcoholic 
must acquire if he or she is to overcome a debilitating appetite for 
alcohol. 
Self-knowledge is also what we need if we are to respond properly to 
the ecological challenge. That may seem to be an extraordinary claim, 
especially as we quite clearly need to know much more about the nature 
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of this challenge and about the effects of human actions on the physical 
environment. As I see it, however, the attempt to gain self-knowledge is 
part of these wider enquiries. To know ourselves is to know that we are 
parts of nature - not independent of but interdependent with it. If we 
are to be self-governing, then we must have some grasp of how we as 
human beings fit into the larger scheme of things. Like the alcoholic, we 
must learn that some of our habits and tendencies are self-destructive 
because they threaten, as Leopold warned, the food chain, the land 
pyramid, and the biotic commumty of which we are inescapably 
members. If we are to be autonomous, in sum, we must come to 
understand ourselves not only as free but also as natural agents. 
Ecology and the right of autonomy 
My conclusion, then, is that people need not surrender their freedom in 
order to respond effectively to the ecologteal challenge. To be sure, they 
must surrender some of their options, or option-freedom, but that is not 
the same as surrendering their agency or their autonomy. But what of 
their rights? Must these be lost if nature is to be saved? 
If rights presuppose agency, as I have followed Benn in holding, then 
the answer is surely no. Some particular rights will be lost, of course, 
when laws limit people's options. For example, laws that create a green 
belt around a metropolitan area may deny farmers the right to sell their 
farms to those who would build housing estates on the land. But green-
belt laws would also give others the right to open countryside within a 
reasonable distance of their homes, and it is not obvious that there 
would be a net loss of rights once the gains are set against the losses. 
In general, the contraction or reinterpretation of property rights would 
be offset or outweighed by the expansion of both substantive and 
procedural environmental rights (Eckersley 1996: 228-33; Nickel and 
Viola 1994). 
The more important point, though, is that facing up to the ecological 
challenge is entirely consistent with the right of autonomy, which I have 
elsewhere elaborated as the right on which all others rest: the right to 
the promotion and protection of the ability to lead a self-:governed life. 7 
We are both individuals and members of communities, on this view. We 
owe our individuality and whatever degree of autonomy we attain in 
large part to the other members of our communities, but they also owe 
us respect for our autonomy, whether potential or actual. They owe us 
respect for our right of autonomy, that 1s, just as we owe them respect for 
7 In Dagger 1997, esp. ch. 3. For criticism, see Knowles 2001: 161-5. 
214 Richard Dagger 
theirs; for only an agent who is capable of respecting the rights of others 
can be the bearer of rights. As members of communities, of course, we 
cannot always have things our own way. What counts, however, is that 
we have a chance to make ourselves heard and to be accounted an equal 
in public deliberations. When these conditions hold, we need not worry 
about losing the fundamental nght of autonomy. 
What the ecological challenge teaches us is that we are not only 
individuals who are members of communities with other people; we are 
also members of biotic commumues that are themselves parts of nature 
as a whole. We must grasp this fact, and come to understand its 
implications, if we are to be autonomous. This does not mean, again, 
that bogs and precipices have rights agamst us. But it does mean that we 
should think of rights not simply as barriers or shields that protect us 
against others, but as forms of relationship that enable us to pursue 
peacefully our private and public endeavours. Of all these, the greatest 
may be the endeavour to meet the ecological challenge. 
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